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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) outflows on the labor market outcomes in Austria. In the last fifteen years there has been a significant increase in the globalization of the Austrian economy through an increase in exports, final imports, offshoring (intermediate imports), and outward FDI. The integration of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) to the European economic sphere, added a new dimension to the globalization of the Austrian economy, although Austrian FDI towards Western Europe also increased significantly during this period. The globalization of the economy has, however, coincided with adverse developments in the labor markets.
1 Since the 1980s industrial employment is decreasing, and total employment is stagnant in spite of the jobs created in services. The decline in manufacturing jobs is an ongoing process of structural change that started in the 1980s, but the decline did not decelerate after 1990
compared to the 1980-1990 period in spite of the improved trade position of Austria. The opposite trend in domestic employment compared with the increasing foreign affiliate jobs is rather striking as can be seen Figure 1 . In the meantime real wages have stagnated in the total economy particularly since the mid 1990s. The service wages are even slightly declining in the 2000s. This development is in striking contrast to the strong improvement in labor productivity, which has always exceeded real wage increases since the 1980s with few exceptions. As a combination of these developments, the wage share (labor compensation/gross value added in non-agricultural sector) declined from a level of 65% in 1978 to 51% as of 2005.
The decline in labor share is not specific to Austria, although Austria has experienced one of the highest rates of decline in the wage share among the OECD countries. The general declining trend in labor's share in many OECD countries since the late-1970s and early 1980s has been analyzed by several previous studies (Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Epstein, 2000 , Guscina, 2006 Stockhammer et al, 2007) , and is recently also discussed by the OECD (2007), IMF (2007) , and the European Commission (2007) . Both the deterioration in the wage share and industrial employment is a phenomenon that dates back to late 1970s, which is partly related to structural change and technological improvement. However the strong increase in the foreign affiliate employment in the same period brings forward the question whether the acceleration in the decline in the wage share and stagnation in employment since the mid-1990s is also related to increased multinational activity.
. Austria is an interesting case to investigate the effects of FDI on labor market outcomes, being a small economy, which is highly integrated to the other high wage as well as low wage countries. It is also a puzzling case, since the deterioration in labor market performance and income distribution continued in spite of the significant profitability gains due to Eastern enlargement in the past years (Altzinger, 2006) .
In this paper first we estimate the effects of FDI on employment and wages for a panel of sectors for the period of 1996-2005, and then combining these effects we calculate the cumulative effects on functional income distribution, i.e. the wage share. In the estimations we control for technological change. The effects are separately estimated for low and high skilled sectors and the industry vs. services as well. We pay particular attention to the possible different effects of FDI in the developed countries vs. the CEECs, i.e. low wage countries.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the home country effects of FDI on both wages and employment, and finally to combine these effects to address the effect on functional income distribution using detailed sectoral analysis. The existing literature on the home country effects of FDI for other countries estimates mostly the effects on employment (e.g. Blomström et al. 1997; Brainard and Riker 1997; Hatzius, 1998; Hanson et al, 2003; Konings and Murphy, 2006; Becker et al, 2005; European Commission, 2005, Cuyvers et al; 2005; Molnar et al 2007) and in a few cases also the effects on wages (e.g. Desai et al 2005) .
The issue of distribution is however only addressed with regards to within labor distribution, 4
i.e., the share of skilled workers in the wage bill (e.g. Slaughter, 2000; Head and Ries, 2002 and Altzinger, 2001; Marin, 2004; Pfaffermayr, 2001; Falk and Wolfmayr, 2007a, b) . Our paper has also important differences in comparison to these papers with respect to the methodology of estimation of the employment effects, which will be discussed in more detail in Section five.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the empirical model and the theoretical expectations about the effects of FDI on labor market outcomes. Section three discusses the data and methodological issues. Section four reviews the empirical literature. Section five presents the estimation results. Section six concludes.
The empirical model
This section presents the labor demand and wage bargaining equations, which then are solved simultaneously to calculate the effect of FDI on labor's share.
The industry's demand for labor is given as follows:
where ln(l), ln(w), ln(q), and ln(K) are employment, wage (labor compensation, deflated by sectoral producers price index), real value added, and real capital stock of the parent firm respectively; ln(w f ) is the wage in the foreign affiliates of the multinational firm.
All variables are in logarithms.  measures other possible determinants of labor demand. A similar function is estimated by Hanson et al (2003) to estimate the effects of multinational 5 activity on domestic employment. The constant-output own-wage elasticity of domestic labor demand, w  , is assumed to be negative.
Regarding the direction of the foreign wage effect, the question is whether foreign labor is a substitute or complementary to domestic labor. In a capital abundant country, it could be expected that increased multinational activity may lead to some increase in the use of capital and less demand for labor. In a skilled labor abundant country the demand for skilled labor's employment is also expected to increase relative to unskilled labor as headquarter services increase (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . But skilled labor might also be substituted by foreign labor through an overall increase of capital intensity at home. So initially employment at the parent company may fall due to substitution effects, but then there may be additional production of skill-intensive products to be exported to the foreign affiliates or elsewhere (scope effects), and a general increase in market share and output due to cost saving effects (scale effects), which may increase also overall employment (Hanson et al., 2003) . Thus the net effect depends on the negative substitution vs. positive scope and scale effects, i.e. the net of jobs destroyed and created. Horizontal FDI, compared to vertical FDI, will have less effect on the composition of factor demand, but through the trade channel it may generate negative employment effects particularly in tradable sectors, since it replaces the exports of the country (Head and Ries, 2002) (Hanson et al, 2003) , thus scale and scope effects dominate.
If there are positive scale effects, these will be already captured by output. To decrease this bias, we use value added instead of output as a control variable in Equation (1); but nevertheless part of the scale effect will still be captured by the value added.
Capital is treated as quasi-fixed as it is common in the current literature (Morrison, 1986; Berman et al, 1994; Slaughter, 2000; Head and Ries, 2000; Hanson et al 2003; Becker et al, 2005; Cuyvers et al, 2005; OECD 2007) . This is also preferable from an empirical point of view, since it is hard to measure the capital costs.
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In the following we modify the empirical model due to data constraints: we do not have data about the wages in the affiliates of the multinationals; however we have data about the employment in the affiliates weighted by the share of the parent firm. The only data available on foreign wages is sectoral average wages in the host countries based on different data sources. However, the FDI literature reports significantly higher wages and productivity in foreign owned firms than in the domestically owned firms (Lipsey, 2004) . Therefore average sectoral wages could be a misleading proxy; thus we prefer to use the affiliate employment as a proxy for the wages in the affiliates. Desai et al (2005) , Molnar et al (2007) , and Falk and Wolfmayr (2007a, b) also estimate domestic employment as a function of the foreign affiliate employment. Head and Ries (2002) estimate the share of the non-production workers in the wage bill as a function of the foreign affiliate employment/home employment.
Our transformation follows the following logic: the foreign affiliate employment, ln(f), is a function of wages at the home country, ln(w), and at the affiliate, ln(w f ), as well as the value added, ln(q f ), and capital, ln(K f ) at the affiliate:
Solving for ln(w f ) in equation (2), and substituting in equation (1) 
The problem of the lack of data for foreign employment on domestic employment will be opposite.
Another data problem is that we have only data at sectoral level, not at firm level.
Therefore in this paper we are estimating sector-specific labor demand. Thus the foreign affiliate employment will have not only a direct effect on employment in the parent companies but also an indirect effect due to the possible spillovers to the other domestic firms. Lipsey (2004) points out that there may be a difference between firm and industry level studies, since substitution among types of activities may take place not only between home and foreign operations of a firm, but also between parent firms and non-multinational firms in the same industry at home. It is possible to have a case where the parent company enjoys 8 positive scope and scale effects, but the employment in the sector overall is negatively affected through substitution of domestic supplier networks with the foreign affiliate supply.
Renaming the coefficients in equation (3), the sector's demand for labor is given as follows:  is a sector specific coefficient. The issue of endogeneity of wages will be handled by the use of proper instrumental variables at the estimation stage, as will be discussed in more detail in Section three.
The wage bargaining model is given as follows:
where all variables are as defined above. This model is consistent with union bargaining and efficiency wage models (Konings and Vandenbussche, 1995; Greenaway et al, 2000) . In order to avoid the complications of modeling the formation of price expectations, an ex post bargained wage model is used. We thus look at the outcome of bargaining, i.e. the (ex post) real wage. Furthermore to be parallel to the labor demand equation, we are estimating real wages deflated by producers' prices rather than consumer prices 3 . The employment in the 9 foreign affiliates captures the effects of relocation on the bargaining power of domestic labor, and shifts the bargaining curve. Since employment in the foreign affiliates is also a function of domestic wages, proper instruments will be used at the estimation stage in order to avoid endogeneity. 4 For a given capital/labor ratio the effect, f  , is positive, if foreign labor is complementary, and negative if it is a competitor. Particularly efficiency seeking FDI may generate negative effects through the so called threat effects as pointed out in the political economy literature (Onaran, 2009; Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Burke and Epstein, 2001; Rodrik, 1997; Crotty et al, 1998) . The increase in international capital mobility and the consequent asymmetry between the fall back options of capital vs. labor may lead to a downward pressure on bargaining power of labor and thereby wage demands. This may particularly be the case if the destination of FDI is low wage countries. However even among high wage countries capital mobility may generate certain labor disciplining effects.
Furthermore the threat effect may take place even in the absence of relocation, thus it may not be directly reflected in the actual volumes of capital flows (Burke and Epstein, 2001 ).
The capital/labor ratio, thus ln(k)+ln(ict)-ln(l), determines the productivity of labor and thereby worker's aspirations, and is expected to have a positive effect on wages, but the degree at which workers can index wages to productivity improvements will depend on their bargaining power. Also in more capital intensive sectors with a higher capital/output ratio the organizational strength and the bargaining power of the workers is expected to be higher, and firms would be more willing to accommodate wage demands, since labor costs are constituting a smaller part of their total costs. In the case of ICT-capital, however, the positive effect may be reversed with a technological replacement effect, particularly for the less skilled workers.
The employment in the sector captures the insider power and the demand effect, and will affect workers bargaining power positively and lead to a higher real wage. However the responsiveness of wages to employment will also depend on the strategy of the labor unions, i.e. the trade-off between wages and employment for the unions during a recession. Unions may choose to bargain for job protection and accept stagnant wages, in which case the positive effect of employment on wages will disappear. Moreover in our model employment and capital stock are used both in logarithms. Thus the negative denominator effect of employment in the capital/labor ratio will also be incorporated to the coefficient of employment (in logarithm) in our model, making the interpretation of the sign of the coefficient hard. We nevertheless prefer this equation because it is parallel to the employment equation, which will have a computational advantage when deriving the wage share below.
Capital stocks and employment are also treated as endogenous.
α i is a sector specific coefficient. α t is the time dummy, accounting for the economy wide labor market conditions that affect workers' outside options 5 , an alternative economy wide wage 6 , the institutional factors that may affect the bargaining power like union density, collective bargaining coverage 7 , structural change in the composition of the workers, the effects of major changes in industrial relations after privatization 8 , and the threat effects due to potential capital mobility not captured by actual volumes.
Finally the wage share (labor compensation share in value added) in logarithms, ln(ws), is by definition
Solving equations (4), (5), and (6) simultaneously we get:
where x is the vector of ln(q), ln(k), ln(ict), and ln(f). We take the derivative of ln (ws) with respect to the components of x, e.g. the foreign affiliate employment, ln(f), for a given value added 9 :
This expression incorporates the effect of the foreign affiliate employment on wages discounted by the effect of domestic wages on employment (if wages have a negative effect on employment) and the effect of the foreign affiliate employment on domestic employment amplified by the effect of domestic employment on domestic wages, both discounted by a common factor ( 
Data and estimation methodology
The empirical analysis is based on the panel data of the sub-sectors of the industry and services. Appendix B reports the data sources. Employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in each sector is further disaggregated as affiliates in developed countries with relatively higher wages vs. the East 11 . FDI to other countries is not incorporated as a third category since their share in total outward FDI is negligible. The sectors are defined according to the sector of the foreign affiliate. 12 The detailed data for employment in the foreign affiliates is available only at the level of 1-digit NACE classification and for the period of 1993-2004.
Capital stock is also only available at 1-digit level.
In all equations lags of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable will be used to account for short vs. long run effects 13 . The lagged employment accounts for the adjustment process due to costs of hiring and firing. The lagged wage accounts for sticky wage adjustment through time. Furthermore, the capital stock and the foreign affiliate data ends in 2004; in order to be able to estimate the effects including 2005, we will use the first and second lags of these variables. By doing so we do not lose observations overall. Using deeper lags makes also economically sense, since the effect of both capital accumulation and FDI on labor markets may require a longer adjustment process.
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Thus the equations (4) and (5) to be estimated for employment and wages take the following form respectively:
The sector index i=1,…,12 for the industry 14 i=13,…,20 for services, i=1,…,20 for the total economy 15 , and t=1996-2005. 16 c is the affiliate country index corresponding to affiliates in developed countries vs. the East. We also estimate the effects for a pool of economy wide high and low skilled sectors including both manufacturing and service sectors in order to account for different impacts in sectors hiring pre-dominantly skilled vs. less skilled labor.
Appendix C reports the skill taxonomy.
We estimate the dynamic equation in first difference form in order to transfer out the fixed effects, and use a generalized method of moments (GMM) technique as in Arellano and Bond (1991) to overcome the bias that will result in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable due to differencing. The importance of the partial adjustment process are the reasons for estimating a dynamic specification in difference form rather than a fixed effects models, which would have the advantage of accounting for heterogeneity across sectors. Nevertheless the disadvantage of the dynamic estimation is the low number of cross-sections. We compute standard errors that are robust to the existence of sector specific serial correlation.
Additionally, the real wage is endogenous and therefore instrumented in the employment equation. In the wage equation employment, capital stock, and foreign employment are all endogenous and instrumented. GMM technique of Arellano and Bond (1991) is particularly 13 useful in dealing with cases of endogeneity, when no good instruments are available outside the immediate data set (Roodman, 2006) . In the employment equation the instruments are employment dated t-2 and earlier, the second and third lags of real wage 17 , and the first differences of the exogenous variables, i.e. output, capital stock, foreign employment and their lags. In the wage equation the instruments are wages dated t-2 and earlier, the second and third lags of employment, the third and fourth lags of the capital stock, and foreign employment.
Based on these estimation results we calculate the long run coefficients using the contemporaneous and lagged effects and the speed of adjustment. The wage share effects in equation 8 are then calculated using these long run coefficients.
Empirical Literature
In the empirical literature regarding the home country effects of FDI, there are rather mixed results (Molnar, et al, 2007; Lipsey, 2004) . Blomström et al. (1997) analyze the relation between employment in the parent firm and foreign production based on firm level data for the US and Sweden, and find some negative relationship in the US particularly due to activities in developing countries, but a robust positive relation in Sweden, suggesting differences in investment strategy. Contrarily Hatzius (1998) (2007) find that multinational activity has a significant positive effect on employment growth in the US, but a negative effect in Japan, and no effect in Germany. In the case of multinationals in the EU, Konings and Murphy (2006) find substitution effect between parent employment and its affiliates in the EU15, but no effect with respect to the low wage regions in the EU and the Regarding the effects of FDI on employment in Austria, Bellak and Altzinger (2001) find a negative effect of affiliate sales on parent employment using firm level data for 1995.
However Marin (2004) , again using firm level data for 1999-2001, finds no statistically significant effect of affiliate sales on parent company's employment, and even a complementary effect of the wages of the affiliates in the CEECs on parents' employment (negative coefficient), but no effect of wages of the affiliates in the South Eastern European or former Soviet Union countries. Falk and Wolfmayr (2007a) find no significant impact on industrial employment, but a negative effect on services due to affiliate employment in both developed countries and the five New Member States based on sectoral dynamic panel data estimations for 1994-2004. Based on firm level data, they find no significant effect of affiliate employment on parent employment (Falk and Wolfmayr, 2007b) . Pfaffermayr (2001) estimates relative employment at home vs. the foreign affiliates as a function of relative wages based on sectoral panel data for the manufacturing industry for 1990-96, and finds that employment at home industry relative to the employment in the foreign affiliates in developed countries have a positive cross-wage elasticity indicating substitution between home and foreign employees, whereas the opposite is true in the case of the affiliates in the four Eastern European neighbor countries. Table 1 reports the estimation results for employment modeled as in equation (4a) for the industry, the total economy, low and high skilled sectors, and services. We will base our discussion of the regression results on the long-run effects, rather than separately discussing the current or lagged effects.
Estimation results

Employment
Please insert Table 1 approximately here The Sargan test (from the homoskedastic estimator, which is reported at the end of the result tables) can not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid.
There is no second order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, which is an important condition for the validity of the estimations. The lagged dependent variable is significant in all specifications, verifying the need for a dynamic model.
In the industry an increase in the foreign affiliate employment in the East has a significant negative long run effect on employment in the same sector in Austria. The same effect takes place in the total economy and in both the low and high skilled sectors. The effects are economically significant as well. corresponding to an increase of 241% in employment in the affiliates in the East in all sectors.
To put it differently each job that has been created additionally over this period in the Eastern affiliates of Austria has substituted 0.53 jobs in net terms in the industry, and 0.58 jobs in the total economy (as a ratio to jobs created in the Eastern affiliates). These numbers show the net of the jobs lost due to substitution and the jobs created due to scope and scale effects.
Please insert Table 2 approximately here Regarding the employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in developed countries while no effect can be detected in the industry, there seems to be a significant negative effect in services. However these results need to be interpreted with care, since estimations cover only few sectors (thereby few observations), and while the direction of the effects is indicative, the magnitudes can be misleading.
The workers working in the higher skilled sectors are more affected than those working in the lower skilled sectors; however employment declines in both sector groups due to outward FDI.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, while value added as well as non-ICT capital have positive effects, the ICT capital has a negative effect on industrial employment, reflecting the effects of labor saving technical change. The effect is economically highly significant in spite of the existence of time dummies. In the total economy the effect ICT capital as well as non-ICT capital is insignificant, whereas growth remains to be significant. Comparing with the other studies on Austria, the negative effects of Eastern affiliate employment are consistent with the findings in Bellak and Altzinger (2001), but not those in Marin (2004) . However both studies are not directly comparable with ours, since they use firm level data and concentrate on the effects on the parent company and do not discuss the indirect effects at the sector level. Furthermore their periods of analysis cover earlier phases of Austrian FDI (1995 FDI ( and 1999 FDI ( -2001 , and the country coverage is also more limited than ours.
Pfaffermayr (2001) nevertheless employment in the Eastern foreign affiliates went on increasing (Pfaffermayr, 2001 ). This implies a positive own-wage elasticity of labor demand in the foreign affiliates. In the meantime manufacturing employment in Austria declined, implying a negative crosswage elasticity of home labor demand, which supports the complimentarity thesis from the perspective of foreign wage elasticity. Given our discussion in section two, however, this implies a negative effect of the foreign affiliate employment on domestic employment, thus a substitution relation between the two quantities of labor. The two outcomes are consistent in this special case of the parallel movement of foreign wages and employment in the affiliates.
The most recent and comparable study on Austrian employment is by Falk and Wolfmayr (2007a) which uses the same data set as this paper, and finds a negative effect of affiliate employment in services (in the dynamic specification), which is consistent with our study; however there are differences with respect to the destination of FDI: we find no effect of Eastern affiliate employment in services, whereas they do. More importantly, in the industry they find no significant effects contrary to us. There are a number of methodological differences in detail, which could explain these different findings: One difference is that they cover only the Eastern employment in the five NMS, leaving out roughly one third of the foreign affiliate employees in Eastern Europe during the 2000s. The more important difference is the use of lags: while they do not use lagged effects, we find that this makes a difference in the results. They use the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator, we repeated our estimations using also this estimator using the lags of the foreign employment variables instead of just the current value, and we again find a negative effect of affiliate employment in the East. 18 However, when current values are used instead of the lagged values, the effects of foreign employment are not significant. Since it takes a while for domestic production and employment to adjust to the changes in the international division of labor and the possibility of new production locations abroad, lagged effects are important, and
should not be disregarded.
Further evidence based on firm level data is supplied by Falk and Wolfmayr (2007b) , according to which they find no significant effect of affiliate employment on parent companies' employment. However they report only static OLS estimations in differences;
thus both dynamic estimations and lagged effects could significantly change these results.
Furthermore even if there are no significant negative effects on the parent companies, the indirect spillovers might well be negative. Our sectoral estimations incorporate also such indirect effects, and negative effects seem to be dominating according to our results. Table 3 reports the estimation results for real wages modeled as in equation (5a).
Real wages
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According to the long-run coefficients, employment in the foreign affiliates in the East as well as developed countries have a significant negative effect on wages in the industry, but no effect in the total economy. This is due to the positive effects in the services: there is evidence of some positive effect of affiliate employment in the East on wages in the services as well as in the low skilled sectors. This could be explained by a positive scope effect and skill upgrading in the low skilled or services sectors, which have a complementary relation to Eastern affiliate employment. In the total economy the increase in affiliate employment in developed countries has a negative effect in only low skilled sectors, whereas there is a negative wage effect of Eastern affiliate employment in high skilled sectors.
Please insert Table 3 approximately here Table 2b shows the cumulative effect of each explanatory variable on wages, calculated as the long run coefficients multiplied by the actual change in the explanatory variable. In terms of economic significance, the increase in the affiliate employment in the East and developed countries resulted in a 17.9% and 7.2% cumulative decline in real wages in the industry during the period of 1996-2005 respectively. Thus altogether real wages would have increased 25.2% more in the industry, if there were no Austrian foreign investment in this period.
Regarding the other explanatory variables, while employment has a negative effect on wages in the industry, non-ICT capital stock has a positive effect, reflecting an increase in wages together with the capital intensity of the sector. Again the time dummies remain significant and are mostly negative, indicating the significance of institutional factors as well as possible negative threat effects of potential capital mobility that is not reflected by the volume of actual transactions.
Wage share
Combining the long run effects on employment and wages as defined in equation (8), we get the joint effect of the changes in capital stock (ICT and non-ICT) and the employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria. Based on the calculated long run coefficients for the wage share, Table 2c reports the cumulative %-points effect 20 of the actual change in the explanatory variables. These effects are partial effects for a given level of value added.
According to the estimation results, in the industry the increase in employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in the East and the developed countries has resulted in a cumulative decline of 13.2%-points and 4.7%-points in the wage share respectively during 1996-2005 (thus a total of -17.9%-points). These results overestimate the 8.2%-points actual decline in the wage share, however the direction is suggestive. In the total economy the effects are economically not very significant due to the lack of negative wage effects: the 21 increase in the Eastern affiliate employment has resulted in only a minor 1.8%-point decline in the wage share.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the effects of outward FDI on employment, wages, and the wage share in Austria. There is evidence of significant negative effects of FDI on both employment and wages. The negative employment effect of Austria's investment abroad is primarily due to the rise in the employment in the foreign affiliates in the East. The employment in the foreign affiliates in developed countries seems to have a negative effect in services only. The negative wage effects are originating from affiliate employment in both the East and the developed countries in the industry, but no effect is found in the total economy. There is evidence of some positive effect of affiliate employment in the East on wages in the services due to possible scope and skill-upgrading effects. Bringing together these effects we find that the increase in employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria has resulted in a deterioration of wage share with the effect originating from both country groups in the industry, and only from the East in the total economy. The results are not limited to workers in low skilled sectors; there are also negative effects in high skilled sectors.
Technological change also results in a significant decline in the industry wage share;
however the negative effects of FDI remain significant after controlling for technological change, and are larger than that of the technological change. Note: The cumulative effect of each explanatory variable on employment is calculated as the long run coefficients calculated based on the estimation results in Table 1 for employment and Table 3 for wages multiplied by the actual change in the explanatory variable. The effect on the wage share is calculated by combining the effects on employment and wages as in Equation (8). 
